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Abstract
Once spacecraft are launched, it is impossible for engineers to physically repair any-
thing that breaks onboard the vehicle. Instead, remote solutions must be employed to 
address spacecraft anomalies and fault conditions. To achieve this goal, telemetered 
data from the spacecraft are collected and assess by ground personnel to resolve prob-
lems. However, if the ground-to-spacecraft communication system breaks down, or the 
vehicle delivers an anomalous signal, a rigorous protocol must be employed in order to 
re-establish or fix the telecommunications link. There are several factors that can con-
tribute to link problems, such as malfunctions or mishandling of the ground station 
equipment, onboard failures of the spacecraft’s flight software coding, or even mishaps 
caused by the space environment itself. This chapter details the anomaly recovery pro-
tocols developed for the Cassini Mission-to-Saturn project, to resolve anomalous link 
problems as well re-acquisition of the spacecraft should a complete Loss of Signal (LOS) 
condition occur.
Keywords: Cassini, spacecraft, Saturn, deep space network communications, fault 
protection, loss-of-spacecraft-signal, anomalous downlink
1. Introduction
Despite the vast distance between remote-controlled interplanetary spacecraft launched from 
earth and the Deep Space Network (DSN) ground stations that operate them, the communi-
cations link to the spacecraft is very reliable, thanks to the extraordinary telecommunication 
capabilities built into NASA’s DSN antennas around the world and the spacecraft’s own sys-
tem design. For the Cassini Mission-to-Saturn spacecraft (Figure 1), it takes nearly an hour 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the t rms of the Crea ive
Comm ns Attribution Lic nse (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
and a half for commands from the Spacecraft Operations Flight Team (SOFS) here on earth to 
reach Cassini, where the orbiter is touring the Saturnian system (~8.5 AU). Yet, an anomalous 
downlink (D/L) signal condition can occur (or complete LOS) from several sources: environ-
mental effects such as bad weather conditions at the DSN station or station problems (broken 
equipment), erroneous ground commands uplinked (U/L) to the spacecraft by the SOFS team, 
errors in the onboard running sequence, spacecraft pointing errors, internal FSW errors, or 
computer platform failures can cause problems when attempting to acquire the spacecraft’s 
D/L signal. The space environment itself can also contribute to an LOS condition, since cosmic 
ray bombardment on the spacecraft’s systems can cause spurious Solid State Power Switch 
(SSPS) trip-off of the spacecraft’s Radio Frequency System (RFS) units, as well activations of 
the onboard Fault Protection (FP) routines which will reconfigure to redundant backup RFS 
units, so that reconfiguration by the ground is required in order to lock-up on the spacecraft’s 
D/L signal.
To safeguard against these DSN-spacecraft link problems, troubleshooting methods have been 
developed by the Cassini SOFS team to diagnose and resolve conditions that inhibit spacecraft 
signal acquisition. A “Loss of Downlink Signal Recovery” protocol was developed for the SOFS 
team to follow in the event of an anomalous D/L signal (or completed LOS), as well as special 
FP which is implemented into Cassini’s onboard FSW. This algorithm will monitor for pro-
longed absence of ground commanding, eventually invoking a “Loss of Commandability” FP 
(FP which is typically implemented into most deep space missions to safeguard against these 
undetected, sometimes waived or ground-induced failure conditions). Called “Command Loss 
FP” (from the perspective of the spacecraft since it’s no longer receiving ground commands), 
this “catch-all” type of autonomous monitor-response algorithm will observe the absence of 
Figure 1. The Cassini-Huygens spacecraft.
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ground commands for a predetermined (programmable) period of time, using a “countdown 
timer” which decrements until it is reset by a ground command or reaches “0” (which triggers 
the response). An extended series of actions are then commanded by FP to re-establish ground 
commandability by configuring various telecom arrangements and spacecraft attitudes in an 
attempt to find a viable U/L path. Each attempt by the response to command a new path is sepa-
rated by an appropriate ground response interval for the SOFS team to re-acquire the spacecraft 
via U/L command.
In all anomalous spacecraft D/L cases, it is desirable to re-establish spacecraft communications 
before the Command Loss Response activates in order to avoid the autonomous commanded 
actions of the FP: termination of the onboard running sequence (lost science opportunities), 
device swaps, propellant consumption via commanded turns, etc. Therefore, an expedient 
method for identifying possible anomalous/LOS causes is highly desirable before the FP acti-
vates, if possible. To aid in this goal, an Excel tool was developed to supplement the LOS 
Recovery Protocol in “timeline” format. Described herein are the optimized solutions imple-
mented on Cassini for re-acquisition of the spacecraft’s signal during anomalous D/L and LOS 
events, as well as an expedient method for recovery from the actions of the Command Loss 
Response, if activated.
2. The Cassini mission
NASA’s Cassini Mission-to-Saturn spacecraft is the first robotic mission ever to orbit the planet 
Saturn. Managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, this flagship-class mis-
sion is composed of 11 operating scientific instruments which study many intriguing features 
of Saturn, its moons, and ring system. The Cassini Program is an international cooperative 
effort involving primarily NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and the Italian Space 
Agency (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, ASI). Cassini is the fourth spacecraft to visit the Saturnian 
system (but is the first vehicle to enter its orbit), and is composed of the NASA/ASI Cassini 
orbiter and the ESA-developed Huygens probe. Cassini launched on October 15, 1997, arriving 
at Saturn in 2004, after performing scientific observation of Earth’s moon, Venus, and Jupiter 
(as well as participating in several scientific experiments) during its 6.7 year cruise period. 
Cassini’s suite of (currently operating) science instruments consists of the following (Figure 2):
1. Composite Infrared Spectrometer (CIRS)
2. Ion & Neutral Mass Spectrometer (INMS)
3. Visible & Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (VIMS)
4. Ultraviolet Imaging Spectrograph (UVIS)
5. Imaging Science Subsystem (ISS)
6. Magnetospheric Imaging Instrument (MIMI)
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7. Dual Technique Magnetometer (MAG)
8. Cosmic Dust Analyzer (CDA)
9. Radio & Plasma Wave Science instrument (RPWS)
10. Radio Science Subsystem (RSS)
11. Radar
Also included onboard Cassini is the Huygens Probe; an atmospheric laboratory designed 
to collect data in the Titan Moon atmosphere and its surface. Deployed in January 2005, the 
Figure 2. Cassini’s instrument suite.
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probe consisted of six scientific instruments which performed experiments in aerosol collection, 
descent imaging & spectral radiometry, gas chromatography & mass spectrometry, atmospheric 
sampling, and surface science. The entire Cassini mission consists of seven phases:
• Launch and initial acquisition of the spacecraft (October 15, 1997)
• Inner cruise (beginning October 20, 1997)
• Outer cruise (beginning February 2000)
• Science cruise (starting July 2002)
• Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI; July 2004)
• Huygens Probe Release (January 2005)
• Saturn Tour continues (2004–2017)
During the cruise portion of the journey to the Saturnian system, two gravity assist maneu-
vers were required from Venus, one from Earth, and one from Jupiter. Until Cassini reached 
2.7 AU from the sun (during the inner cruise phase), communications between earth and the 
spacecraft were accomplished via the Low Gain Antenna (LGA), since the 4-m diameter High 
Gain Antenna (HGA) must be used to shield the spacecraft from the sun’s heating (i.e. used as 
a sunshade). After reaching this distance (begin Outer cruise phase), communications begin on 
the earth-pointed HGA.
Figure 3. Cassini’s prime, equinox XM, & solstice XXM tours.
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Cassini’s “Prime Tour Mission” began in 2004, where planet/moon science investiga-
tion activities continued until 2008. Two mission extensions were granted: the “Equinox 
Mission” from 2008 to 2010, and the “Solstice Mission” from 2010 to 2017 (Figure 3, [1]). 
The spacecraft’s 20 year mission ends with 42 orbits around the main ring system (Figure 4, 
[2]). Beginning on November 30, 2016, Cassini’s orbit reoriented the spacecraft to the outer 
edge of the main rings to perform a series of 20 F-Ring orbits; a region of Saturn’s rings 
which look like an odd “interwoven” structure. The last time that Cassini observed these 
rings close-up was at Saturn arrival in 2004, which allowed observation of only the dim, 
backlit side. But in November of 2016, numerous opportunities became available to exam-
ine the F-Ring’s structure, with high-resolution observation of both sides of the F-Ring. 
The final mission phase called “The Grand Finale” began in April 2017 with a close flyby 
of Saturn’s giant moon Titan, which provided re-orientation of the spacecraft’s trajectory, 
allowing it to pass through the gap between Saturn and the D-Ring; the closest ring to the 
planet. With only a 1500 mile-wide corridor to fly through, Cassini will investigate this 
unexplored region of the Saturnian system, making the closest observations of Saturn to 
date. During these last 22 (D-Ring) orbits of the Cassini mission, the planet’s magnetic 
and gravity fields will be mapped with high precision, and extremely close views of the 
atmosphere will be observed. New insights into Saturn’s interior structure, the precise 
length of a Saturnian day, and the age and total mass of the rings will also be evalu-
ated. On September 15, 2017, Cassini will end its 20 year mission with a fiery plunge into 
Saturn, providing valuable data about the planet’s chemical composition as the friction 
forces (from the atmospheric entry) cause the vehicle to burn up, thus satisfying Planetary 
Protection requirements [3].
Figure 4. Cassini’s end-of-Mission F & D Ring Orbits.
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3. The Cassini radio communications system
Cassini’s onboard telecommunications system consists of three antennas: a High-Gain 
Antenna and two Low-Gain Antennas (LGA-1 & LGA-2); all which interface with the RFS 
system (which performs command, telemetry, and radio-metric communications) and 
Radio Frequency Instrument Subsystem (RFIS); Figure 5. Cassini’s 4-m Cassegrain HGA 
Figure 5. The Cassini spacecraft.
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communicates with earth on X-band, and on S-Band with the Huygens probe (and radio-
science). It also communicates on Ka-band to support radio science activities, and Ku-band 
for the imaging RADAR subsystem. The two LGA antennas operate on X-band only, with 
LGA-1 mounted on the top of the HGA (giving it an unobstructed field of view of 112°), and 
LGA-2 which is mounted on a boom below the Huygens probe near the bottom of the vehi-
cle, yielding a 120° field of view. The LGA antennas were used for communication with the 
ground when the HGA could not be configured on earth-point due to thermal constraints 
(when in close proximity to the sun). In this case, the spacecraft had to be shielded by the 
HGA, leaving the LGA antennas to transmit and receive data at very low delivery rates. The 
LGA antennas are configured when FP executes.
Spacecraft are typically equipped with transmitters of relatively low radiating power for com-
munication with earth (20 Watts for Cassini). This telecommunications link must bridge the 
distance of over a billion kilometers (earth-Saturn distance), which is achieved by employing 
frequencies in the microwave range using reflectors onboard the spacecraft to concentrate 
all available power into a narrow beam pointed precisely towards earth. Cassini’s HGA is 
used to achieve this goal (as opposed to the LGA antennas which sacrifice gain but provide 
relatively uniform coverage over a wide range of spacecraft orientation angles). At the DSN 
station, large aperture Cassegrain reflectors are used to pick up the spacecraft’s signal. These 
radio antennas use cryogenically cooled (low-noise) amplifiers to first amplify the faint space-
craft signal, followed by sophisticated receivers and decoders which can lock onto and extract 
the data with virtually with no errors at all.
The signal delivered from the spacecraft to earth’s ground station is called a “downlink,” 
and the transmission of commands and sequences from the ground to the spacecraft is called 
an “uplink.” When a D/L signal is received from the spacecraft, the communication is called 
“one-way” (or if the D/L signal is generated onboard the spacecraft itself, the communication 
is also called “one-way”). When the U/L signal is being received by the spacecraft at the same 
time a D/L is being received by the ground station, the communication is called “two-way.” 
Both U/L and D/L consist of a pure Radio Frequency (RF) tone which is called a “carrier.” In 
order to carry information to or from the spacecraft, the carrier signal must be “modulated.” 
A modulated signal may be sent from the ground station to transmit commands to the space-
craft. Likewise, the modulated signal is generated by the spacecraft to transmit science and 
engineering data to earth on its D/L carrier. The spacecraft’s carrier signal is also used for 
tracking and navigation (as well as some types of science experiments such as radio science 
or gravity field mapping). Each DSN complex uses a hydrogen-maser-based frequency unit 
which is maintained in an environmentally controlled room (in the basement), sustained by 
an uninterruptable power supply. The maser serves as the reference for generating a pre-
cisely known U/L frequency. When an U/L signal is received by the spacecraft, it can choose 
to use the received U/L carrier to control its D/L carrier transmission (called 2-way coherent 
transmission). This ground-generated reference frequency is multiplied by a predetermined 
constant (1.1748999 for Cassini) and the transmitted D/L signal is phase coherent with the U/L 
signal (this multiplier prevents the D/L signal from interfering with the U/L signal which is 
Space Flight230
being received from the ground). Precise tracking of the spacecraft is accomplished through 
this method, as well as the ability to carry out high precision science experiments onboard 
the orbiter.
Cassini carries its own Ultra-Stable Oscillator (USO). During the one-way phase when the 
spacecraft transmits its signal to the ground (before two-way communication is established), 
the spacecraft must generate its own D/L signal using the on-board USO. Once the ground’s 
U/L signal is acquired by the vehicle, it will abandon its own D/L signal to regenerate the 
D/L, thus changing the frequency. During this time, the ground station will “lose lock” on 
the spacecraft and must tune in the new frequency. This “out-of-lock” condition is predeter-
mined by the ground (on the order of a minute or two), so that data delivery to the ground 
is temporarily halted during this transition period, in order to preserve the precious science 
data. The USO device is quite reliable in generating a stable D/L signal, more so than the 
2-way method with the ground, because the ground U/L signal phase is subject to corruption 
by atmospheric effects, solar wind, etc. Therefore, the USO is more desirable than the hydro-
gen maser. However, the USO frequency cannot be precisely known if the D/L frequency 
changes due to relative motion of the spacecraft (as well as vehicle drifting). Since ranging is 
fundamentally a phase measurement, the ground must use the hydrogen maser referenced 
U/L along with phase coherent receivers on the spacecraft and on the ground to determine 
the correct measurement.
4. Cassini mission telecommunications operations in flight
NASA’s DSN is a part of JPL, consisting of a worldwide network of US spacecraft communica-
tion facilities. Placed approximately 120° apart around the Earth, three deep-space telecom-
munications stations are located in Goldstone, California (US), Madrid, Spain, and Canberra, 
Australia. The placement of these ground stations permits constant observation of spacecraft 
like Cassini as the Earth rotates. Unlike near-earth orbiters which move quickly round the 
earth, few ground stations are required to support deep space missions since they are vis-
ible for long periods of time. As mentioned before, these earth-based DSN ground stations 
contain steerable, high-gain, parabolic reflector antennas, providing a two-way communica-
tions link that tracks robotic interplanetary spacecraft like Cassini, acquiring telemetry data, 
transmitting commands, uploading software modifications, tracking spacecraft position and 
velocity, measuring variations in radio waves to support radio science experiments, and col-
lecting science & engineering data. Interplanetary spacecraft such as Cassini, require huge 
DSN antennas with ultra-sensitive receivers and powerful transmitters in order to transmit/
receive information over the vast earth-planet distances, with the largest antennas of the DSN 
often called upon during spacecraft emergencies. Nearly all spacecraft are designed to use the 
smaller DSN antennas (e.g. 34 m diameter) for nominal operations, but for a spacecraft emer-
gency, the largest antennas are typically used (e.g. 70 m diameter) since the onboard FP typi-
cally configures low transmitter power, so that recovering any available telemetry is crucial to 
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assessing the spacecraft’s health in preparation for recovery actions. In the case of Cassini, the 
LGA is configured by FP with very low U/L & D/L rates.
Ground commands from earth travel at the speed of light (referred to as “One-Way Light Time;” 
OWLT), reaching Cassini from approximately 1 hour. 15 minute to 1 hour 30 minute, depend-
ing on the relative distance between earth and Saturn, given the change in relative distance 
due to the earth’s rotation around the sun and the spacecraft’s motion around the Saturnian 
system. Therefore, the majority of commands sent to the spacecraft for operations and science 
investigations must be uplinked to the Command & Data processing System (CDS) comput-
ers in large “command sequences,” which consist of several weeks of planned commanding. 
These sequences typically consist of commanded turns to point Cassini’s 11 operating instru-
ments towards specific targets, providing high precision (down to the sub-milliradian) via 
two Attitude, Articulation, & Control System (AACS) computers. Captured science data is 
recorded on two Solid-State Recorders (SSR) during off-earth observation periods. These sci-
ence activities (e.g. moon and ring encounters) are paused typically once each day (or two) for 
approximately 9 hours to establish communication with earth (via a scheduled DSN station) to 
downlink the science & engineering (housekeeping) data.
Once Cassini’s earth-pointed attitude is stabilized, its D/L signal is received by the DSN sta-
tion. Ten minutes later, the ACE initiates the U/L signal for commanding and navigational 
purposes. The data is transmitted from the spacecraft in the format of “symbols” which are 
“wiggles” in Cassini’s radio signal’s phase. The DSN receives the symbols and decodes it into 
“0” and “1 seconds” in order to reconstruct the telemetry data (engineering housekeeping 
data, science digital images, etc.). After the 9 hours of telemetry data have been downlinked 
to earth’s DSN ground station, the spacecraft reduces its data rate, suspends its data playback 
(from the SSRs), and turns to the next science target via the onboard running sequence to col-
lect new science data [4].
4.1. Nominal S/C acquisition
Prior to spacecraft acquisition at JPL’s Space Flight Operations building in Pasadena, 
California, the “Cassini ACE” Real-time Operations Engineer must prepare to receive the 
data transmission stream from Cassini, and is in voice contact with the DSN station staff 
(in California, Australia, or Spain). The Cassini ACE provides their station operator with a 
2  minute briefi ng to review the expected events for the day, before the DSN pass starts (any 
planned Reaction Control System (RCS) burns or Main Engine (ME) maneuvers, Flight 
Software (FSW) patches or uploads, etc.) and provides any pertinent updates. The DSN sta-
tion operator, in turn,  provides a weather report (clear skies or rain, plus wind conditions) and 
that all equipment is in working order (green), or has suffered a system breakdown (red). The 
designated (34 m or 70 m) antenna at the DSN station for the day’s 9 hour pass has already 
been pointed precisely towards Saturn where Cassini’s faint signal will be received. Once the 
spacecraft’s signal has been acquired, the DSN station operator reports to the Cassini Ace 
that the station’s receiver is “in lock.” The Cassini Ace then acknowledges that the telemetry 
at his/her workstation is being received and looks nominal. From this point, the 9 hour DSN 
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pass is in progress with Cassini transmitting its telemetry data. Thousands of engineering 
telemetry measurements (i.e. temperatures, voltages, pressures, computer statuses detailing 
the vehicle’s health and status) are interleaved with the science data.
4.2. Anomalous D/L conditions
An “out of lock” condition can occur suddenly if Cassini’s signal strength drops out (LOS con-
dition). This can be caused by rain at the DSN station from too many water molecules in the 
vicinity of the antenna which give off an abundance of radio noise that can literally drown out 
the spacecraft’s signal. In this case, the “DSN Receiver Status” on the Cassini ACE’s console will 
light up with an “OUT OF LOCK” reading. The measured system operating noise temperature 
on the console should rise high enough to indicate that rain is the reason for the signal loss. But 
if bad weather is not the cause of the LOS condition, or caused by an unforeseen problem in 
the ground system equipment itself, the ACE will contact the Operations Chief (who is concur-
rently working with the Cassini ACE at JPL), to request that a second DSN antenna look for the 
spacecraft’s signal, if available. If no signal is detected, the Cassini ACE will declare a “LOS con-
dition” and proceed to follow the “LOS/Anomalous Downlink Contingency Plan” Procedure 
which requires that he/she contact the appropriate SOFS team members. These are spacecraft 
subsystem experts who must evaluate the situation and concur with the Cassini ACE that there 
is no earth-based problem causing the LOS condition (ground station or weather). In this case, 
the most likely explanation is that an onboard RFS-related FP routine has triggered. Numerous 
fault monitors are installed into Cassini’s FSW that are constantly running to detect faults in 
spacecraft systems. Upon fault detection, a “canned” response routine(s) is executed autono-
mously to fix the problem, which is typically followed by an activation of the Safing Response. 
This response places the spacecraft in a predictable state, configuring lower power consump-
tion with low U/L and D/L rates on LGA, commanding the HGA to sun-point (off earth-point). 
In the case of a RFS FP routine activation, the RFS device states might be altered, as a swap to 
a redundant RFS unit is commanded which changes the telecommunications configuration for 
D/L signal acquisition.
The ACE knows that Cassini will have transitioned from the HGA to the LGA antenna, 
should the FP activate. The LGA provides an extremely weak D/L signal since its beamwidth 
is much larger than the HGA beamwidth. At Saturn, the spacecraft’s signal is so weak that 
telemetry delivery is only possible at 5 bps, requiring nearly 18 hours to receive all 30 decks 
of telemetry data that are needed for the SOFS team members to verify the spacecraft’s health 
and determine its post-fault states. Recovery from any fault is extremely slow, but if no atti-
tude control system problems are present and spacecraft attitude knowledge is preserved 
(no faults in the AACS computers), a second FP routine called the “High Gain Antenna Swap 
(HAS) Response” will automatically activate 1 hour after the Safing Response concludes. 
This FP will increase the U/L and D/L rates (D/L = 1896 bps), followed by a turn of the space-
craft’s HGA to earth-point. In this configuration, all 30 decks of telemetry data are deliv-
ered to the ground in approximately 10 minutes, making recovery from the fault much more 
expedient. For typical FP activations, the SOFS team will examine the spacecraft telemetry 
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for off- nominal conditions, sometimes reading out additional sections of Cassini’s computer 
memory to confirm the diagnosis, and then prepare commands for the ACE to send which 
will recover the spacecraft from the FP activation, and restart the onboard running sequence 
once again.
In certain cases, complete LOS can occur. Resolution of a LOS fault may require extra DSN 
coverage, depending on the difficulty in determining the fault cause. As mentioned previ-
ously, the Cassini ACE also looks for other DSN tracks that can be borrowed from other flight 
projects or scheduled maintenance for the next few days. If the LOS condition persists, a 
“spacecraft emergency” will be declared to guarantee continuous DSN coverage to support 
spacecraft recovery efforts.
4.3. No spacecraft signal acquisition (LOS)
Unlike most faults that trigger the onboard FP, a fault causing total LOS means no acquisition 
of the spacecraft’s signal at all (i.e. no lock-up on the expected or post-FP RFS configuration) 
by the DSN station. There are several reasons why a LOS condition can occur. These include 
DSN station breakdowns, misconfigured lock-up parameters, or even faults which are not 
detected by the FP design. Unfortunately, not every spacecraft fault case can be precluded by 
the onboard FP. In spite of the best efforts of pre-launch designers to identify all possible fault 
scenarios and produce a FP system to support them (detect, isolate, & resolve), certain failure 
modes are sometimes missed or are very difficult to avoid. Most JPL projects like Cassini strive 
to meet a “Single Point Failure” (SPF) policy [5], but certain failures cannot be easily detected, 
or are not identified during the design phase, and some failures can actually occur even though 
they have been exempted or waived [6]. Other LOS fault possibilities are problems that occur 
in devices which are intentionally not protected by the onboard FP. These devices include 
the HGA or LGA antennas, Waveguide Transfer Switches (WTS), and the USO on Cassini. 
Multiple faults are also a possibility, since they do not fall under FP design guidelines due to 
the SPF policy.
Hence, LOS can occur from several sources: erroneous ground-generated commands uplinked 
to the spacecraft, onboard sequence failures, multiple failures which are not typically required 
to be addressed by the onboard FP, spacecraft pointing errors, failed telecom configurations 
(via ground commanding), internal FSW errors, computer platform failures, bad weather, 
or DSN ground equipment failures. Also, not only can RFS FP swap to redundant units due 
to device faults and malfunctions, thus inhibiting the ground from locking up on Cassini’s 
signal (since the RFS D/L signal path has changed), but environmental effects can also cause 
a LOS condition. SSPS trip-off of RFS units (caused by cosmic ray bombardment) can also 
cause temporary loss of the spacecraft’s signal. To address this condition, the Cassini ACE 
must perform several “uplink sweeps” on different variations of the RFS units in an attempt 
to re-acquire the spacecraft’s D/L signal. Once ground problems and weather are ruled out as 
an LOS cause, the assumption is that hopefully the onboard FP has executed and commanded 
a RFS device swap to a redundant unit. Otherwise, determination of the fault cause becomes 
increasingly difficult to diagnose.
Space Flight234
5. Cassini LOS experiences
Cassini has experienced several LOS events during its mission lifetime. Some events have been 
caused by relatively minor problems, but two events are of significance. The first occurred on 
May 1, 2006. At the beginning of the DSN track, the DSN station was unable to acquire the 
spacecraft’s “one-way” carrier signal (i.e. the ground-received spacecraft signal), which in 
turn, initiated the anomaly response process. However, after Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT; 
twice OWLT) had elapsed, the DSN station was able to lock up on the “two-way” carrier 
signal and the spacecraft’s data. Telemetry indicated that Cassini’s USO had suffered an SSPS 
trip event [7].
Cassini’s power system consists of power control boards which contain 192 SSPS. SSPS trip 
events occur spuriously and without warning, on average 2–3 times per year due to the 
unforeseen environmental effects of galactic cosmic ray bombardment [8]. This condition is 
thought to be caused by one or more photon hits on the voltage comparator of the device, 
resulting in a false indication that the current load is anomalously high, thus tripping off the 
switch. Because of this phenomenon, a new “SSPS Trip FP” monitor & response algorithm 
was uploaded to the Cassini spacecraft’s FSW. The monitor examines one SSPS switch state 
per second, (starting with switch number 1), and proceeds through all 192 SSPS switches. If a 
SSPS trip is detected, the response contains a table of appropriate actions for FP to act upon, 
based upon the specific SSPS switch and its function. The actions of the original SSPS FP 
response table for the USO (uplinked prior to 2006) only recorded the USO trip event (USO 
SSPS is #68) and cleared the tripped condition by commanding the unit OFF. However, after 
this USO trip event occurred, the response table was augmented (via uplink command) to 
command the device on (see Table 1).
Five years later on December 23, 2011 at the Beginning of the DSN Track (BOT), once again, no 
D/L signal was seen from the Cassini spacecraft. The DSN station at Canberra was supporting 
Cassini at the time. Following ACE direction, additional tracking was obtained using a Canberra 
station antenna, as well as a Goldstone station antenna, but without successful acquisition of the 
spacecraft’s signal. The SOFS Anomaly Team was called together to diagnose the problem. At 
RTLT, Cassini was once again acquired in 2-way mode, confirming that the problem was with 
Table 1. SSPS trip FP for USO trip (post-2006).
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the spacecraft’s USO. Commands were sent on Christmas Day to inhibit the USO and swap to 
the Auxiliary Oscillator as the frequency source for the D/L signal until the fault within the USO 
device could be evaluated.
The next step for the SOFS team was to evaluate whether one-way operation of the USO was 
functioning properly (the two-way U/L must be halted in this case). Once configured, the DSN 
station was unable to lock onto Cassini’s one-way signal which indicated that the USO was not 
operating properly. After a second attempt to establish the one-way link failed, a command was 
sent to inhibit the USO, allowing the Auxiliary Oscillator to take over again for spacecraft oper-
ations. Further tests conducted in January of 2012 confirmed that normal USO operation could 
not be re-established. After consulting with Radio Science and Applied Physics Laboratory 
(the builder of the USO), it was decided that the USO would be power cycled in an effort to 
“reset” the unit, although it was thought unlikely to work since the USO is an analog device. 
On January 9, 2013 the USO was powered OFF permanently and the Auxiliary Oscillator has 
been in operation ever since.
6. LOS protocol
For Cassini, addressing an “anomalous downlink” or LOS condition starts with the RFS 
Subsystem’s “LOS/Anomalous Downlink Contingency Plan” Procedure to help identify 
possible reasons for the abnormal (or absence of) the spacecraft’s D/L signal. This proce-
dure describes possible troubleshooting methods and recovery actions needed for both off-
nominal signal levels (e.g. carrier power is too low or too high) as well as partial lock-up 
conditions (e.g. no subcarrier, symbol, telemetry, or frame lock-up), and complete LOS. The 
procedure provides diagnoses & recovery actions in the form of flowcharts for the ACE and 
SOFS Anomaly team members to follow. Five partial signal loss/LOS candidate faults are 
considered when determining required anomaly resolution actions:
1. Spacecraft is not on earth-point when expected due to an incomplete turn, a fault in the AACS 
system, or FP activation.
2. DSN ground-station problem: station is not tracking the spacecraft properly, station receiver 
is down, breakdowns, weather, etc.
3. Spacecraft telecom problem: there is a problem in the telecommunications system (error caused 
by the onboard sequence commanding, ground U/L commanding, or the FP has executed)
4. Loss of the CDS (most likely a multi-fault condition)
5. Multiple faults or a catastrophic failure
RFS FP response actions are also noted in the recovery strategy flowcharts of the procedure 
and specify the expected post-fault RFS device states. Any attempt to re-acquire the spacecraft 
on the newly commanded RFS configuration is directly dependent on when the FP response 
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has concluded. Attempted spacecraft recovery actions continue through each branch of the 
flowcharts until re-acquisition of the vehicle is successful (if possible).
For a complete LOS condition, the Cassini ACE must perform the “uplink sweep” on the correct 
RFS device configuration to re-acquire the spacecraft [9]. The assumption is that the activation of 
a RFS FP response will have swapped to its counterpart unit, possibly changing the polarity of 
the D/L signal. Depending on the failure (or number of failures), several RFS device combinations 
are possible with variations on the following components, depending on which FP has activated 
and what the current RFS prime units are:
• DST-A/CDU-A or DST-B/CDU-B (Deep Space Transponder; Command Detector Unit)
• TWTA-A or TWTA-B (Traveling Wave Tube Amplifire)
• TCU-A or TCU-B (Telemetry Control Unit)
• WTS-A or WTS-B (Waveguide Transfer Switch)
• LGA-1 (LGA-2 is no longer in use) or HGA antenna
• Auxiliary Oscillator or DST VCO (Voltage-Controlled Oscillator)
Figure 6 depicts the RFS Functional diagram for Cassini, whose prime RFS units are: DST-A/CDU-
A, TCU-B, and TWTA-B; WTS-A used for U/L, WTS-B used for D/L. The use of these devices are 
listed below:
• DST: is used for both the U/L and D/L function
• CDU: is part of the DST and used for the U/L function
• TWTA: is an amplifier used in the D/L function
• TCU: controls the RFS system.
• WTS: provide switching capability for transmitting or receiving the signal through the 
HGA, LGA-1, or LGA-2 antennas.
• Auxiliary Oscillator: provides 1-way D/L carrier frequency reference.
• VCO: is part of the DST and provides 2-way D/L carrier frequency reference.
Also included in certain RFS FP response actions is a Power-on-Reset (POR) of the prime TCU 
and/or the Power subsystem where selected devices are turned off, reset, or reconfigured, 
which will select spacecraft components according to their own FP protocols. Further compli-
cating the anomalous/LOS condition is the fact that RFS FP algorithms are multi-tiered (address 
several different fault types), and can activate at any time per their persistence counters (unique 
for each FP algorithm) which can range from seconds to minutes, further reconfiguring these 
device states after spacecraft re-acquisition is attempted, so that it is difficult to know which 
RFS combinations for the ACE to try (or which combinations should be re-tried or eliminated). 
Therefore, it is very important to keep track of when RFS related FP responses have timed out.
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7. Command loss FP
An unresolvable LOS condition where the ground is no longer able to deliver commands 
to the spacecraft will eventually lead to the activation of a LOS FP response. The actions 
of this response can help to re-establish the U/L. In Cassini’s FP design, loss of D/L fault 
coverage is not protected in an “end-to-end” manner since the D/L is not considered to be 
a critical spacecraft function which requires autonomous restoration. But restoration of 
the U/L however, is considered crucial to mission success and is therefore allocated “end-
to-end” protection through a “Loss of Commandability” algorithm [10]. Although several 
other (higher priority) FP routines are installed into Cassini’s FP suite to protect against 
these same type of failures in the U/L path (which provide more timely action), the Loss 
of Commandability algorithm provides a “safety net” type of FP which has the potential 
to restore both U/L and D/L. With this scheme in place, multiple levels of FP defense are 
provided (covering up to 3 faults).
This catch-all type of FP is referred to as a “Command Loss FP” (from the perspective of the 
spacecraft since it is no longer receiving ground commands) and is typically an “endless-
loop” response. The Command Loss Monitor aboard Cassini will detect an extended period 
Figure 6. Cassini’s RFS functional diagram.
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of time during which no commands have been received by the spacecraft from the ground. 
The Command Loss Monitor is configured with a timer which counts down from a program-
mable value (usually days) until it reaches “0” seconds or is reset via ground command (on 
Cassini, this “Command Loss Timer” (CLT) is currently set to 115 hours). The receipt of a 
valid U/L command by the spacecraft will reset the timer to its original value and restart 
the countdown. This provides an end-to-end check on command functionality between the 
vehicle and the ground. If triggered (timer reaches “0”), the Command Loss Response will 
initiate an extended series of actions which are designed to re-enable ground commandability 
onboard the spacecraft. The response will attempt to command various telecom configura-
tions and spacecraft attitudes in an attempt to find a viable uplink path. Each reconfiguration 
of a new uplink path is separated by an appropriate ground response interval for the SOFS 
team to re-acquire the spacecraft.
Figure 7 illustrates Cassini’s Command Loss Response chain. Once triggered, it progresses 
through a series of “Command Groups” divided by multi-hour “Command Pauses” 
which allow the SOFS team to react by sending an U/L command to halt the response. The 
Command Groups consist of actions to reconfigure redundant hardware and re-command 
spacecraft attitude and antennas. Each Command Pause allow several hours for the SOFS 
team to attempt re-acquisition of the spacecraft upon the newly commanded spacecraft con-
figuration (the pause durations are set to a minimum of two RTLT periods). As shown in the 
figure, the first Command Group will select the Auxiliary Oscillator and execute the Safing 
Response which will turn off non-essential spacecraft loads, place the spacecraft in a lower 
power state, and re-direct the spacecraft’s High Gain Antenna to sun-point, placing the 
spacecraft in a low U/L & D/L state through the LGA-1 antenna. After the first Command 
Group has executed, a 15 hour wait period (Command Pause) allows sufficient time for the 
SOFS Anomaly team to assemble at JPL and attempt re-establishment of the U/L, if possible, 
before RFS hardware swaps begin in successive Command Groups. If the re-acquisition 


























































Figure 7. Cmdloss response actions.
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course of actions specified in Command Group #2, which starts the series of RFS hardware 
unit swaps. Seven hour Command Pauses are installed between each subsequent Command 
Group to allow the SOFS team sufficient time to re-acquire the spacecraft on the newly com-
manded configuration. If the SOFS Anomaly team is able to re-acquire the vehicle within the 
first 71 hours (during the RFS unit swap phase), it is permissible for the HAS Response FP 
to execute (1 hour after the Command Loss Response has been terminated) via the selected 
(6NOP) U/L command which halts the response. Faults resolved during this first 71 hours 
are deemed to be “non-severe,” since they are associated with RFS device failures. The HAS 
Response will increase the post-Safing U/L & D/L rates and swap from LGA-1 to the HGA 
antenna. However, if the Command Loss Response proceeds to Command Groups #5, it 
must be halted using the HAS FP “disable” command to keep the spacecraft on LGA-1 with 
the lower U/L & D/L rates, since the fault is considered to be too severe to transition to the 
higher rates. At the end of the Command Loss Response chain (approx. 7 days 15 hours), 
a swap to the redundant CDS is commanded and the Command Loss Response will start 
all over again on the redundant backup computer. The response will run endlessly until an 
U/L command is received by the ground. Once the spacecraft receives a ground command 
which restores the uplink successfully, the response will terminate and reset its Command 
Loss Timer, thus leaving the spacecraft on the last (successfully) commanded RFS/antenna 
configuration.
8. The LOS/Cmdloss timeline EXCEL tool
In all cases, it is desirable to re-acquire the spacecraft before the Command Loss algorithm times 
out and triggers its response, if at all possible, since this FP routine will configure the LGA antenna, 
which yields extremely slow data delivery. Should this response trigger, the Command Group 
actions (device swaps, etc.) most likely cannot be confirmed in telemetry with the very slow D/L 
rate of 5 bits per second. Therefore, it was determined that two timelines were needed to provide 
visibility into fault possibilities and to supplement the LOS/Anomalous Downlink Contingency 
Plan Procedure recovery efforts: 1) a pre-Command Loss Response “LOS Timeline” containing 
FP expiration times (and the corresponding RFS configurations) to eliminate the numerous fault 
possibilities, 2) a timeline to track the Command Loss Response actions if activated. This goal was 
accomplished through the development of an EXCEL tool which receives minimal user inputs, 
utilizing the Space Flight Operations Schedule (SFOS) file which is used daily by both the ACE 
and SOFS teams. The “LOS/Cmdloss EXCEL Tool” provides the following:
• Sheet #1: instructions for using the EXCEL Tool & required inputs taken from the SFOS file
• Sheet #2: Timeline #1 starting from LOS occurrence = > CLT = 0 seconds (Command Loss Re-
sponse trigger time)
• Sheet #3: Timeline #2 detailing the Command Loss Response actions from CLT = 0 seconds 
through one entire CDS response cycle
• Sheet #4: all corresponding end conditions for each FP response activation in Timeline #1 with 
the required recovery actions
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9. EXCEL tool example: 2011 USO Failure
Experience gained from the failed USO/LOS event on December 23, 2011 at BOT led to the 
development of this LOS/Cmdloss Timeline EXCEL Tool. To demonstrate its use, an example 
is provided here for this USO failure event.
Once no signal was detected from Cassini on Day of Year (DOY) 357 of 2011, the ACE pro-
ceeded to follow the “LOS/Anomalous Downlink Contingency Plan” Procedure, perform-
ing sweeps of the spacecraft on different RFS configurations to attempt re-acquisition of the 
vehicle. A second DSN station was requested and confirmed no acquisition of Cassini’s signal 
(ruling out weather and station configuration problems). Had the EXCEL tool been avail-
able at the time, the following data would have been collected from the SFOS file as noted in 
Figure 8:
1. Time of LOS = > 17:15:00 UTC
2. OWLT = > 1 hour 23 minute 51 seconds
3. Year = > 2011
4. Last time CLT was reset = > DOY357 @ 02:15:00 UTC
Figure 8. SFOS file for USO failure event.
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5. Command Loss Defaults = > 115 hours
6. Prime RFS Devices set to: DST-A, TCU-B, TWTA-B
Once these data had been collected per the instructions listed in Sheet #1, EXCEL Sheet #2 
inputs would be entered in the YELLOW spaces as shown in Figure 9, which in turn, will 
cause Sheet #2 through Sheet #4 to be populated with desired timing/post-fault configuration 
data. Copies of the SFOS and Sheet #2 though Sheet #4 would then be printed and distributed 
to each subsystem once the Anomaly team gathered to determine the cause and resolution 
of the LOS condition. As the group followed along with the SFOS file in LOS Timeline #1, 
spacecraft recovery efforts would have been coordinated with the Cassini ACE via telecom. 
All system-level FP responses are included in the LOS timeline for completeness (RFS-related 
responses are shown in red). These are the LATEST times that the FP responses would con-
clude, assuming that each activation started at BOT. Fault cases would be eliminated by the 
SOFS Anomaly team once re-acquisition for each completed FP response failed to re-establish 
the earth-spacecraft link.
INPUT DATA:  Fill in Yellow slots only (ERT)
OWLT: Hr Min Sec  CLT Default = 115 (in hours)





Year = 2011 RTLT
20:02:42
BOT = 17:15:00 (HH:MM:SS) PST
                          << HGA Swap Response >>
                       @ OWLT + 1hr.
. . . . . .
361  T 21:15:00
. . . . . .
1 hr 2 hr                   Elapsed Time Since BOT (hrs.) 3 hr 5 hr
1
 Response acons contain unit swap(s)
2
 Exact response me is variable:  SSPS FP Filter contains 3 cycles (192 switches *3); this trip occurrence can occur any me within the last 192sec cycle (i.e. +/-3.2min)
3
 RFS POR
Note 1:  All mes in ERT (UTC)
Note 2:  Failure to acquire S/C aer OWLT has elapsed could denote a problem with the 1-way oscillator (Aux Osc)
Note 3: RED-LOS related faults; BLACK non-LOS faults Not to Scale
TCU SSPS Trip or Fail (HGA)
1,3
TCU SSPS Trip or Fail (LGA) 
1,3
Shallow UV (LGA)
DST SSPS Trip (HGA)
 2
Deep UV (LGA) 
1,3
Alert Msg 1/Safing (LGA) TWTA Fail (LGA) 
1,3
Alert Msg 1/Safing (HGA)
19:26:02 19:39:42
19:39:49
DST Fail (LGA) 
1,3
19:10:17





















Alert Msg 2/CDS Loss (LGA)
~10 min ~38 minOWLT ~10 min ~50 min
CmdLoss = 0 @
USO Failure!
20:02:42
Figure 9. LOS timeline of SFP response expiration times.
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In the figure, each completed response notes whether a RFS POR occurs, as well as RFS device 
swap occurrences. The end of the timeline calculates when the Command Loss Timer will decre-
ment to “0” seconds. For each response case, the resulting antenna selected (LGA or HGA if the 
HAS response is executed for that particular response) is noted in the timeline. Corresponding 
RFS post-response states and end conditions of interest are listed in Sheet #4 (Table 2).
Although there are eight possible RFS combinations (see Table 3), there are only three DST/
TCU/TWTA combinations of interest due to the selection of RFS prime units in the FP (i.e. 
the FP will never command the alternate combinations). Also, telemetry delivery on the post-
Safing commanded LGA is minimal at best, so that the recommendation to the Cassini ACE 
would be to attempt re-acquisition with the FP commanded RFS combinations after the HAS 
response had concluded (since all RFS-related responses will execute the HAS response to 
swap to the HGA antenna and increase the D/L rate). According to the LOS timeline, no 
new RFS configurations will be commanded after 3 hours 20 minute (so that the nominal 
DST-A/TCU-B/TWTA-B arrangement is assumed), since all RFS-related FP responses will 
have  executed. Problems to focus on from this point forward would be an onboard sequenc-
ing error, an activation of the AACS FP, undetected RFS failures not protected by FP, a LGA-1 
or HGA antenna failure, WTS-B failure, multiple faults, or possibly a waived failure; all which 
will most likely leave the spacecraft on the LGA-1 antenna (note: for a USO failure, the DST’s 
VCO will take over the D/L delivery once 2-way communication is established).
Table 2. Post-response concluding end conditions (sheet #4).
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9.1. Command loss response activation
If the SOFS Anomaly team was unable to re-acquire the spacecraft before the Command Loss 
Timer decremented to “0” seconds, the Command Loss Timeline in Figure 10 would have been 
followed in synchrony with the SFOS file. In Sheet #3, the event times are listed in UTC (Universal 
Cmd Loss Pauses: T1 = 15 hrs Prime RFS Unit Commanded:BLUE: Prime DST
T2 = 7 hrs RED:  Prime TCU
T3 = 7 hrs GREEN:  Prime TWTA
T4 = 7 hrs
CLT=0 seconds  => T1 T3 T3 T3 T3     T3             T3
A B B B B B B A B B A A B B A A B A A A A A A B
Time (UTC) HH:MM:SS =>
DOY  =>
Elapsed Time (hr) => T3
T3 T3                             T2 T3   T4             T3
A B A A A A A A B A B B A B B A B B A B B A B B
T3
T3 T3 T3 T3 T3     T3          T4
A B B A A B B A B B B B B B A B A A B A A B A A
T3
Terminate T3 T2    
Response 
with:
B A A B A A B A A
(7days 15hr 29min 27sec)











7:30:49 0:30:49 0:28:41 17:28:38 10:28:35 3:28:35 20:15:35 13:15:27
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CDS Safing
Cmd Grp 2:       
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(&CDUs)
Cmd Grp 5:


























ant & point to 
Earth
Cmd Grp 8:
LGA Issue 7SAFE 



























Point -Z => sun
(Constant roll)
Cmd Grp 6:




& point to Earth
Cmd Grp 8:
LGA Issue 7SAFE (Nom) 
power off USO
Swap CDS Units 
and Repeat 





Disable cmd    
Figure 10. One command loss response cycle (sheet #3).
Table 3. Possible RFS combinations.
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Time Coordinated), which is consistent with the SFOS file timeline (in successive pages to 
DOY357 which are not shown in this article). The timeline is also quoted in terms of DOY and 
elapsed time since the Command Loss Response triggered, showing each upcoming Command 
Group execution time. As mentioned before, the Command Groups consist of actions which 
reconfigure redundant hardware, eventually commanding spacecraft attitude and antennas in 
later Command Groups. Once a ground command is successfully received by the spacecraft, the 
response will be terminated, the CLT reset (to 115 hours), leaving the vehicle on the successfully 
commanded configuration.
The Command Loss Timeline is listed for one “CDS cycle” of the response. If all attempts to 
re-acquire the spacecraft have failed on the first response cycle of Command Groups on the 
prime CDS unit, the backup CDS computer will take over at the end of this response chain (after 
7 days 15 hours 29 minute), so that the cycle is repeated on the redundant computer. As stated 
above, the Command Loss Response is an endless loop algorithm; below are the actions of the 
response cycles:
• 1st Response Cycle: The Prime CDS uses its RAM load; it is then re-booted with a FSW load 
stored on the SSR (at the end of the response cycle).
• 2nd Response Cycle: The BU CDS takes over immediately using its RAM load; it is re-booted 
with a FSW load stored on the SSR (at the end of the response cycle).
Figure 11. LOS/Cmdloss response info for SOFS team & ACE.
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• 3rd Response Cycle: The Prime CDS uses the default SSR FSW load from the previous reset; 
the Command Loss Timer is set to the FSW default value of CLT = 5 days; at the end of this 
cycle, the CDS is re-booted with the same FSW load stored on the SSR (at the end of the re-
sponse cycle), but must wait 5 days before continuing the response.
• 4th Response Cycle: The BU CDS uses the default SSR FSW load from the previous reset; the 
Command Loss Timer is set to the FSW default value of CLT = 5 days; at the end of this cycle, 
the CDS is re-booted with the same FSW load stored on the SSR (at the end of the response 
cycle), but must wait 5 days before continuing the response.
• 5th Response Cycle - ∞: Repeat cycles 3 & 4 above indefinitely.
For the 2011 USO failure event, the EXCEL LOS/Cmdloss Tool would have been used to gen-
erate the supporting data needed for trouble-shooting the anomaly for the SFOS Anomaly 
team, with recommendations included for the Cassini ACE as shown in Figure 11.
10. Other uses for the Excel tool
Cassini also relies upon the Command Loss Response to protect events of significant 
importance should a loss of U/L occur during science experiments and other selected 
spacecraft activities. Figure 12 provides an example of this type of “Command Loss 
Response strategy” used to support the RSS LGA Gravity Experiment performed in 2015, 
where the HGA must be swapped to LGA-1 and then back again to HGA. The risk associ-
ated with this experiment was commanding the WTS switch during the HGA/LGA-1/HGA 
antenna swap series, where if a malfunction occurred on WTS-A, the U/L capability would 
Figure 12. EXCEL tool support of 2015 RSS LGA gravity experiment.
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be permanently lost (since there is no WTS FP on Cassini). In this case, the Command 
Loss Timer default of 115 hours would cause the Orbital Trim Maneuver (OTM) #407 to 
be missed on DOY078 should WTS-A fail (as well as the planned OTM backup opportu-
nity on DOY079). To protect against loss of U/L after the WTS switch is commanded, the 
EXCEL tool was used to predict actions from the Command Loss Response which can pro-
vide a different U/L path through DST-B/WTS-B should WTS-A fail. The strategy shown 
in the figure depicts a reduced Command Loss Timer default of CLT = 72 hours with a 
“command moratorium” period implemented (no commanding allowed), which allows 
a controlled decrementation of the CLT timer during the RSS LGA Gravity Experiment. 
Once the test is complete on DOY075, an attempt to verify the telecom state by uplinking 
the original CLT default value of 115 hours is performed on DOY076. Should this U/L 
command fail to execute on the spacecraft, the command moratorium will continue until 
the CLT clocks down to “0” seconds, allowing the Command Loss Response to execute 
through to Command Group #2 which swaps DST-A= > DST-B, placing the U/L and D/L 
on WTS-B, just before the DSN track starts. The spacecraft would then be acquired on 
this new RFS configuration. The OTM would then proceed on the backup DSN pass. For 
Cassini, a failure of WTS-A would have meant that WTS-B must be used for the remainder 
of the mission, since the WTS-A switch is henceforth unusable. The actual execution of the 
RSS Gravity Experiment was successful without the need for FP intervention.
11. Conclusions & lessons learned
Overall, anomalous D/L and LOS occurrences are very challenging and can be difficult for 
the SOFS Anomaly team to diagnose and resolve. Once the spacecraft’s D/L signal is lost, 
an expedient, accurate resolution process is needed for quick re-acquisition of the vehicle. 
Identification of FP responses, their conclusion times and corresponding end states, as 
well as plausible LOS causes, is extremely helpful in eliminating fault cases systematically, 
thus allowing the SOFS Anomaly team to focus on the actual cause of the LOS problem. 
Unfortunately, pre-launch FP analyses do not always protect against all LOS-related fault 
possibilities since design oversites, lack of schedule or funding in implementing FP algo-
rithms, errors within the FSW, or even false assumptions made during the pre-launch test-
ing phase (waived failures) can occur. In all cases, it is highly desirable to address a LOS 
condition before the Command Loss FP response activates. But if not, a concise timeline of 
this response and its actions is essential in order to coordinate team efforts in attempting to 
re-acquire the vehicle; especially since the LGA-1 antenna is commanded, configuring the 
very low D/L rate which must be delivered through Cassini’s very noisy Auxiliary Oscillator 
(backup device used since the primary USO failed). Therefore, the “LOS/Anomalous 
Downlink Contingency Plan” Procedure in combination with “LOS/Cmdloss” EXCEL tool 
is expected to be very useful when supporting this challenging class of faults during the 
remainder of Cassini’s highly successful 20 year mission, until its final plunge into Saturn’s 
atmosphere on September 15, 2017.




This research was carried out at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 
under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Nomenclature
AACS Attitude, articulation, & control system
ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (Italian space agency)
BOT Beginning of (DSN) track
CDA Cosmic dust analyzer
CDS Command & data processing system
CIRS Composite infrared spectrometer
D/L Downlink
DOY Day of year
DSN Deep space network
ESA European space agency
FP Fault protection
FSW Flight software
HAS High gain antenna swap (algorithm)
HGA High gain antenna
INMS Ion & neutral mass spectrometer
JPL Jet propulsion laboratory
LGA Low gain antenna
LOS Los of signal
MAG Dual technique magnetometer
ME Main engine
MIMI Magnetospheric imaging instrument
OTM Orbital trim maneuver
OWLT One-way light time
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RCS Reaction control system
RF Radio frequency
RFIS Radio frequency instrument subsystem
RFS Radio frequency system
RPWS Radio & plasma wave science instrument
RSS Radio science subsystem
RTLT Round trip light time
SOFS Spacecraft operations flight team
SOI Saturn orbit insertion
SPF Single point failure




UTC Universal time coordinated
UVIS Ultraviolet imaging spectrograph
VIMS Visible & infrared mapping spectrometer
WTS Waveguide transfer switch
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